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Fixed Exchange Rate Credibility with  
Heterogeneous Expectations 
 
I.  Introduction 
In a typical rules-versus-discretion framework, a low inflation policy such as a 
fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned if the benefit of expanding money supply to 
stabilize output is greater than the costs of devaluation, which may include political 
unrest and lost reputation for the central bank. Hence, fixed exchange rate regimes are 
usually less than fully credible.  The possibility of a policy shift in case of a large 
negative shock is anticipated by economic agents and leads to a currency risk premium 
on financial assets.  
Note that the peso problem generated in this framework requires forward looking 
rational expectations. Economic agents must be aware of the tradeoffs involved in 
keeping the peg and must anticipate the circumstances under which the central bank will 
make a policy shift. However, as Feige and Pearce (1976), Mankiw and Reis (2002), 
Sims (2003), and others have pointed out, making informed forecasts is costly. In fact, 
Branch et. al. (2004) argue that financial stability as the one produced by fixing the 
exchange rate will likely result in a declining proportion of economic agents who form 
sophisticated forecasts. Instead, agents will use simpler forecasting techniques such as 
adaptive expectations. The literature refers to this shift in expectations formation as 
“endogenous inattention” or “rational inattention”.  
This leads us to ask what would be the outcome for the credibility of fixed 
exchange rate regimes if only a portion of the population forms sophisticated forecasts 
and, further, if this proportion declines over time as financial stability is sustained. To 
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address this question we incorporate heterogeneous expectations in a model of a fixed 
exchange rate regime with an escape clause as in Obstfeld (1997). Following Evans and 
Ramey (1992), Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), and 
Bomfim (2001), we assume that a proportion of agents form rational expectations while 
the rest form adaptive expectations.  
We find that the more informed agents have less confidence in the peg. Hence, a 
decline in the public’s interest in monetary affairs results in growing credibility of the 
fixed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the central bank is less likely to abandon the 
regime as the proportion of informed agents decreases over time. These results are 
supported with unique evidence from the currency board in Bulgaria. Using a series of 
national surveys, we show that the proportion of people who are knowledgeable about the 
currency board decreased steadily over time. The growing inattention contributed to 
improved confidence in the currency board.  
This is important empirical evidence in the literature on expectations formation 
and endogenous inattention. Lack of data has made it difficult to study expectations 
empirically in the context of fixed exchange rate regimes and in general. Yet expectations 
are of central importance in economic models and especially in models of fixed exchange 
rate regimes where sudden shifts in expectations or the persistence of expected 
devaluation can result in crises (see Dornbusch, 1991, and Obstfeld, 1986). The data we 
use in this paper afford us the opportunity to document that expectations are 
heterogeneous across the population and are dynamic over time, and to investigate how 
expectations relate to information and to other factors.     
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section presents a 
model of a fixed exchange rate regime with heterogeneous agents. Section III presents 
the survey data and section IV the econometric results. Section V concludes with final 
remarks.  
 
II.  Model 
Output y (all variables in logarithm) is given by: 
(1) ( )y y E uπ π= + − −   
where y  is the natural level of output, π  is inflation, Eπ is expected inflation, and u is a 
supply shock with mean zero and variance σ2. The central bank is interested in keeping 
output close to a target level y%  and inflation close to a target π : 
(2) ( ) ( )2 2min L y yπ α π π= − + −%  
where α > 0 reflects the central bank’s aversion to high inflation. The central bank is 
operating under a rule-based regime which specifies that inflation should be π . This 
could be a fixed exchange rate regime where inflation equals the inflation of the reserve 
currency. With a single homogeneous good and no trade restrictions a deviation of 
inflation from π  implies that the peg is abandoned. 
There are two types of economic agents. A proportion θ of all agents have 
adaptive expectations and expect that current policies will continue: 
(3) AE π π=  
and a proportion (1-θ) agents form rational expectations. Rational agents expect that the 
peg will be maintained with probability q and that it will be abandoned with probability 
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(1-q). Thus, rational expectations of inflation are given by: 
(4) ( )1R eE q qπ π π= + −  
where eπ  is expected inflation if the peg is abandoned. These expectations are formed 
before the realization of the shock u.  
 From (3) and (4), expected inflation across the population is given by: 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1A R eE E E q qπ θ π θ π θπ θ π π⎡ ⎤= + − = + − + −⎣ ⎦  
The central bank decides whether to keep or to abandon the peg after observing 
the shock u. To find expected inflation if the central bank decides to abandon the peg, we 
substitute (5) into (1) and then (1) into (2) to arrive at the following optimization 
problem:  
(6) ( ) ( ){ } ( )2 2min 1 1 eL q q k uπ π θ π π θπ α π π⎡ ⎤= − − + − − − − + −⎣ ⎦   
where 0k y y= − >%  is the difference between the target and the natural level of output, 
i.e. k reflects the objective of the central bank to stimulate output. To find the optimal 
inflation rate, first, set the derivative of (6) with respect to inflation π equal to zero: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 0eq q k uα π θ π π θ α π⎡ ⎤+ − − + − − + − − =⎣ ⎦  
Next, take expectations of equation (7) noting that the expected value of the shock is 
conditional on a switch to a discretionary regime, i.e. the expected value of the shock u in 
(7) is not zero. The switch to discretion is induced by a shock that exceeds some value u* 
and, therefore, the expected shock is equal to E(u | u > u*). The value u* will be 
discussed later in the section. Taking expectations of (7) and solving for eπ  yields: 
 (8) ( )( )( )
| *
1 1 1
e k E u u u
q
π π α θ
+ >= + + − − −  
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Substitute (8) into (4) to obtain expected inflation for the rational agents: 
(9) 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 | *
1 1 1
R q k E u u uE
q
π π α θ
⎡ ⎤− + >⎣ ⎦= + + − − −  
If the peg is not fully credible (q < 1) expected inflation for the rational agents is 
greater than expected inflation for the naïve agents (π ).  The difference in expectations 
between the two groups increases in the size of the output objective k and in the size of 
the expected shock E(u|u*), and decreases in the central bank’s aversion to high inflation 
α.  
To obtain expected inflation across the population, substitute (9) into (5): 
(10) Eπ  = π  + (1 )(1 ) ( *)
1 (1 )(1 )
q k E u u u
q
θ
α θ
⎡ ⎤− − + >⎣ ⎦
+ − − −  
From (10) expected inflation is π  if either all agents form adaptive expectations 
(θ = 1) or if the probability of devaluation is zero (q = 1). If all agents are rational (θ = 0) 
and devaluation is certain so that q=0 and E(u|u*)=0, expected inflation becomes:  
(11) Eπ = kπ α+    
which is the solution to the one-period Barro and Gordon (1983) model. Note also from 
(10) that dEπ/d(1-θ)>0 and dEπ/d(1-q)>0, i.e. expected inflation increases in the 
proportion of rational agents and in the probability of devaluation.  
 
 
 
 
Endogenous inattention 
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Sethi and Franke (1995) endogenize the proportion of naïve agents by assuming 
that forming sophisticated forecasts is costly. In their framework, based on the 
evolutionary theories with “replicator dynamics”, the group that has a payoff advantage 
at any given point in time grows relative to the other. The payoff advantage is determined 
by how accurate individuals’ price forecasts are. Sethi and Franke find that if forming 
rational expectations is costless, ultimately all agents will choose to stay informed and to 
use sophisticated forecasts. With costly rational expectations, the proportion of naïve and 
sophisticated agents changes over time. Periods of price stability lead to an increase in 
the proportion of agents who form naïve forecasts whereas periods of instability lead to 
an increase in the proportion of agents who form sophisticated forecasts. Similar to Sethi 
and Franke, Brock and Hommes (1997) endogenize the proportion of informed and 
uninformed forecasters based on the relative costs and benefits of different forecasting 
techniques. The techniques that produce lower mean squared error of forecasts will be 
used increasingly by more people.  
Branch (2004) tests that proposition using price forecasts from the University of 
Michigan household survey data. He confirms that the choice of forecasting method is 
driven by the relative precision of more and less sophisticated forecasting techniques. 
However, Branch (2004) also reports evidence for inertia in the use of forecasting 
techniques, i.e. the switch toward better performing techniques and the switch away from 
worse performing techniques is slowed down by habits and innate preferences.    
In our framework, adaptive expectations based on past inflation do a reasonably 
good job predicting future inflation when financial stability is sustained for some time, 
whereas rational expectations are repeatedly off the mark. Therefore, as long as inflation 
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remains at π  naïve forecasts will be superior to costly sophisticated forecasts and we 
should expect an increase in the proportion of naïve agents θ over time. We now turn to 
the question whether the likelihood of devaluation decreases or increases when fewer 
people are paying attention to monetary policy.      
 
The likelihood of devaluation 
After the shock u is realized, the loss for the central bank associated with keeping 
the peg is given by: 
(12)  ( )2PL E k uπ π= − − −  
whereas the loss associated with a policy shift toward discretion is given by: 
(13) ( ) ( )2 2* *DL E k uπ π α π π= − − − + −  
where π* is optimal inflation under the discretionary regime after the shock u has been 
observed. As in Obstfeld (1997), The switch to discretion occurs when LP - LD  > C 
where C is the cost associated with abandoning the peg. Denote by u* the value of the 
shock u that satisfies this condition with equality. To find u*, first, note that the value of 
π∗ that minimizes LD given expected inflation Eπ is:   
(14) ( )*
1
E k uπ αππ α
+ + += +  
Then substitute for π∗ in (13) and solve for u* from LP - LD  = C: 
(15) ( ) 12* 1u C k Eα π π⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦  
The probability that the peg will be maintained is: 
(16) ( )*q F u=  
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where F is the cumulative distribution function for the shock u.  It follows that dq/du* = 
F′ (u*) = f(u*) > 0.  A higher critical value of u raises the probability that the peg will be 
maintained.  If (16) is substituted into (10):1 
(17) Eπ  = π  + 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
*
1 1 *
1 1 1 *
u
F u k uf u du
F u
θ
α θ
∞⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − − −⎣ ⎦
∫
 
 The two endogenous variables u* and Eπ are jointly determined by equations (15) 
and (17).  Straightforward analysis shows that a greater concern about inflation (higher 
α) and a greater cost C of abandoning the peg each raises the probability of maintaining 
the peg and a greater desire to stimulate output (higher k) lowers the probability of 
maintaining the peg.  The size of the target inflation rate (π ) under the peg has no impact 
since its direct effect on u* is precisely offset by its effect on Eπ. 
 Our primary analytic concern is what happens as the proportion θ of naïve agents 
increases.  To see this, differentiate (15) with respect to θ: θ
π
θ
π
θ ∂
∂−∂
∂−= E
d
du
u
E
d
du *
*
*  or 
θ
π
θ
π
∂
∂−=∂
∂+ E
d
du
u
E *)
*
1(  > 0 since θ
π
∂
∂E  < 0.  It is also the case that 
*u
E
∂
∂ π  < 0.  However, 
stability assures that 
*u
E
∂
∂ π  > -1. Therefore, the critical value u* increases and the 
likelihood of devaluation falls as the proportion of naïve agents grows over time. 
Intuitively, rational agents have a higher expectation of inflation because they take into 
account the possibility of devaluation (which naive agents do not). With fewer rational 
agents, therefore, inflation expectations in the population are lower and output is closer to 
                                                 
1 Note that E(u|u>u*) = * ( ) /[1 ( *)]u uf u du F u
∞ −∫ . Therefore [1-F(u*0]E(u|u>u*) = * ( )u uf u du∞∫ . 
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the target. This, in turn, decreases the incentive for the central bank to devalue.  
Time will tell if the Bulgarian currency board discussed in the following sections 
will be abandoned after a large shock. However, the data presented next allow us to 
investigate some of the predictions of the theory, namely the dynamics of the proportion 
of informed people over time and the heterogeneity of expectations between more-
informed and less-informed people.  
 
III.  Survey data on the Bulgarian currency board. 
Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 1997 after a severe financial crisis.2 A 
currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime similar to a gold standard regime. The 
authorities forego discretionary control over the money supply and replace it with an 
automatic mechanism that links money supply changes to the balance of payments. The 
amount of foreign exchange reserves that the currency board stands ready to exchange for 
domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary base. The currency board has no 
responsibilities to react to unemployment or to finance the budget. Inflation declined 
markedly and has remained low at around 5 percent since 1998.  
An important difference between currency boards and standard pegs is that they 
have a legal framework. In Bulgaria the operating rules of the currency board are written 
into the Law of the Bulgarian National Bank. The legal framework makes it more 
difficult to change the monetary regime, i.e. one could argue that currency boards have 
greater C compared to standard pegs. Furthermore, the legal framework serves as an 
                                                 
2 Dobrinsky (2000) argues that inefficient enterprises were supported by state-guaranteed credits during the 
early years of transition from socialism. In 1996 and 1997, many of the loans became non-performing and 
the effort to keep banks afloat opened up a large budget deficit that was eventually monetized.  
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important “information device” (Ho, 2002) since the objectives and tools of monetary 
operations are spelled out in black and white. Hence, we may have a greater proportion 
of informed agents with a currency board compared to a standard peg.  
Judging from available data the currency board is not fully credible. The average 
spread between interest rates on one-year local-currency bank deposits and euro deposits 
has been 284 basis points since 2000. Furthermore, many Bulgarians prefer to save in 
foreign currencies: about 60 percent of deposits in the banking system are in foreign 
currencies (Bulgarian National Bank, various years).  
The paper uses five national consumer surveys conducted by a national polling 
organization in Bulgaria in August 2000, October 2001, June 2002, August 2003, and 
August 2004. The sample of about 1000 respondents and its demographic structure are 
standard for national surveys taken in Bulgaria and are considered representative of the 
population of 8 million. 
 
Information about the currency board 
The surveys allow us to establish evidence for growing endogenous inattention 
about the currency board (an increase of θ in the model). The surveys probed 
respondents’ level of information about the currency board by asking whether they 
strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with each of the following three 
statements: 
Statement 1: Under the currency board, the authorities cannot issue currency at 
their discretion. 
  
Statement 2: Under the currency board, the executive branch of the government 
cannot borrow funds from the central bank. 
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Statement 3: Under the currency board, the leva (domestic money) in circulation 
have full coverage by the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. 
 
The three statements describe the main features of the currency board. Table 1 
shows that a fairly large proportion of the population recognizes that the currency board 
eliminates monetary discretion. For example, in 2001 54.7 percent of agents either agreed 
or strongly agreed that discretionary money creation is not possible. The percent of 
informed answers was somewhat smaller on Statements 2 and 3, which is not surprising 
given that these statements refer to more technical features of the currency board. 
Overall, judging from the answers to the three statements, approximately 35 to 55 percent 
of the population has knowledge of the operations of the currency board, i.e. (1-θ) is in 
this range.3  
Observe that the percent of “I don’t know” answers increased substantially over 
time. For example, regarding the statement on monetary discretion, 29.7 percent 
answered “I don’t know” in 2000. By 2004 this number nearly doubled to reach 55.4 
percent. Similar increases in “I don’t know” answers are observed for statements 2 and 3 
as well. This tendency is clear evidence for the endogenous inattention hypothesis.  
 
Expected devaluation 
The theory predicts that more-informed agents have lower confidence in the 
sustainability of the currency board. This, combined with a decreasing proportion of 
informed agents, contributes to growing confidence in the currency board. To examine 
                                                 
3 For comparison, Branch (2004) finds that on average about half of the respondents for the University of 
Michigan surveys use sophisticated forecasts. Chavas (2000) finds that 47 percent of market participants in 
the beef market use naïve forecasts. Using similar data, Baak (1999) estimates the proportion of naïve 
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this hypothesis we use the answers from the following survey question that gauged 
expectations: In your opinion, what is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse 
with a sharp devaluation of the local currency in the next 6 months/12 months/5 years? 
Respondents could choose an answer ranging from “very big” to “none”, i.e., zero 
probability of devaluation, or choose to say that they don’t know.  
Table 2 shows that confidence in the currency board has increased over time. The 
percent of respondents who reported zero probability of devaluation in the next five years 
increased from 12.9 percent in 2000, to 17.7 percent in 2002, and then further to 26.3 
percent in 2004. Similarly, the percent of respondents who believed that the probability 
of devaluation is big or very big declined from 39.0 percent in 2000 to 26.2 percent in 
2002 and 25.2 percent in 2004.  
To illustrate the relationship between information and expectations, Table 3 
cross-tabulates expected devaluation for two groups of respondents. The group we refer 
to as the Informed consists of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with at least 
one of the three statements regarding currency board operations.4 The remaining 
respondents comprise the group of Uninformed. The results show that informed agents 
have lower confidence in the currency board. For example, 28.80 percent of the 
uninformed respondents believed that the probability of devaluation was zero over the 
following five years. For comparison, only 15.56 percent of the informed respondents 
had the same expectations. The following section establishes this relationship more 
formally.  
                                                                                                                                                 
agents at about 33 percent.  
4 Similar results are obtained using other definitions of Informed, e.g. the respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with each of the statements or a variable that combines the answers to the three statements 
in a first principal component.   
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IV.  Information and expected devaluation. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of an ordered probit model where expected 
devaluation is explained by respondents’ information about the currency board and 
demographic characteristics. The dependent variable Expected Devaluation ranges from 
1 to 5 where 1 stands for high probability of devaluation and 5 stands for a zero 
probability of devaluation. In addition to the variable Informed, the models include a 
variable for Education (1 if high school or higher education, and 0 otherwise), Age in 
years, Female, and the variable Vote which equals 1 if a respondent votes for the Union 
of Democratic Forces (UDF), the party that introduced the currency board in 1997. 
Political affiliation with UDF might be associated with greater currency-board 
credibility. We also include dummy variables for surveys 2001 through 2004 leaving the 
2000 survey as the reference survey. 5 The estimations disregard the “I don’t know” 
answers. We incorporate these answers in the robustness checks discussed in the 
Appendix.   
The estimation results in Table 4 confirm that greater information is associated 
with greater expected devaluation. Furthermore, the effect of information on expectations 
is stronger over longer forecast horizons. The coefficient estimate on Informed is four 
times larger when we use expected devaluation over the 5 years horizon compared to the 
6 months horizon.  
                                                 
5 Using personal income, the number of observations decreased significantly as many respondents declined 
to give income data. Since income did not come out statistically significant using the smaller sample, we 
opted to report equations that do not include income. All results are available on request.  
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The predicted values from the model imply that, controlling for demographic 
characteristics, the probability that an Informed respondent expects zero devaluation over 
the next five years is 17.16 percent. The same probability for an Uninformed respondent 
is 26.41 percent. Therefore, the decrease in the percent of Informed respondents from 
56.7 percent in 2000 to 36.6 percent in 2004 is associated with a 1.86 percentage points 
increase in the proportion of people who expected zero devaluation. 6 Hence, this shift to 
less information explains about 14 percent of the 13.4 percentage points increase in the 
percent of people who reported zero probability of devaluation between 2000 and 2004. 
Looking at the other estimates, political affiliation with UDF contributes to 
greater confidence in the currency board. There is some evidence that older respondents 
have greater short-term confidence in the currency board. These respondents have 
experienced sustained financial stability under socialism and may be more likely to 
believe that stability can be sustained now as well.7 The dummy variables for the various 
surveys suggest that confidence increased after the 2000 survey and that it generally 
continues to increase over time. This tendency may be attributed to the robust economic 
growth following structural reforms and to the approaching European Union entry 
scheduled for 2007 or 2008 and the EMU entry planned for 2009. A growing economy 
and a predictable exit from the currency board help alleviate concerns about its 
sustainability in the later surveys.   
 
 
                                                 
6 The exact calculation is: (17.16*0.366+26.41*0.634) - (17.16*0.567+26.41*0.433) = 1.86. 
7 Estimations with Informed as dependent variable show that informed respondents are generally those 
with more education. When Informed is not included in the models reported here, the Education variable is 
negative and statistically significant, i.e. education proxies for information about the monetary regime.  
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V.  Final remarks. 
 The theory and evidence presented in this paper show that sustained financial 
stability leads to a reduction of interest among the population in the mechanics of 
monetary affairs. Furthermore, after disinflation has been achieved under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, it is the less-informed agents who have greater confidence in the 
sustainability of the peg. Thus, the decline in information about monetary policy among 
the population contributes to greater fixed-exchange-rate credibility.  
Our theory shows that with growing inattention the central bank is less likely to 
abandon the peg, which might explain why, in addition to concerns related to foreign 
currency debt, countries are reluctant to move away from sustained pegs unless a severe 
shock hits the economy. Another implication of the theory is that the central bank has an 
incentive to become less transparent about its operations. Directing the public’s attention 
to the financial stability sustained for some time is more helpful to engender confidence 
than explaining how the stability was achieved in the first place.  
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Appendix. Estimation robustness checks. 
 
To incorporate the “I don’t know” responses, we employ Heckman’s (1979) 
procedure which allows us to correct for a possible selection bias. The procedure 
involves the maximum likelihood estimation of a participation equation which explains 
the decision to provide a forecast and a probit equation relating expected devaluation to 
information and the demographic characteristics. The procedure produces consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimates by taking into account the correlation of the error terms 
in the two equations.  The dependent variable in the first model in Table A is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a respondent believed that the likelihood of devaluation during 
the next five years is big or very big, and 0 otherwise. In the second model, the dependent 
variable equals 1 if a respondent believed that the likelihood of devaluation is zero, and 0 
otherwise. The participation equation relates the decision to give a forecast to 
demographics: education, gender, and age. Similar results are obtained when the 
participation equation also includes Informed and Vote. The results support our earlier 
results, i.e. expected devaluation increases in information about the currency board. 
Furthermore, the statistically insignificant value of λ indicates that selection bias is not 
an issue. Similar results were obtained by estimating the probit equation explaining the 
probability of zero devaluation without including a participation equation. 
We also estimated the models using residence in the capital as an instrument for 
Informed to correct for possible endogeneity, i.e. if respondents’ decision to become 
informed about the currency board is influenced by their confidence in it. Residence in 
the capital Sofia increases the access to information because most government 
institutions and media sources are there but is not by itself related to the currency board 
credibility. This makes it a useful instrumental variable. These estimations confirm our 
earlier results that more information is associated with less confidence. We can make the 
results available on request.  
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Table A 
Perceived risk of devaluation in the next 5 years.  
Probit model with Heckman correction for selection bias. 
 
Probit equation  
Dependent variable: 1 if the 
probability of devaluation is 
big or very big, 0 otherwise 
Dependent variable: 1 if the 
probability of devaluation is 
zero, 0 otherwise 
Informed 0.183*** (0.036) 
-0.372*** 
(0.053) 
Education -0.222*** (0.049) 
-0.064 
(0.149) 
Age  0.001 (0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Female 0.039 (0.037) 
-0.021 
(0.049) 
Voting for UDF -0.144** (0.053) 
0.153** 
(0.067) 
Dummy for 2001 survey -0.249*** (0.053) 
0.181** 
(0.071) 
Dummy for 2002 survey -0.234*** (0.056) 
0.245*** 
(0.074) 
Dummy for 2003 survey -0.184*** (0.054) 
0.254*** 
(0.073) 
Dummy for 2004 survey -0.271*** (0.052) 
0.487*** 
(0.079) 
Constant  -0.023 (0.082) 
-0.956*** 
(0.160) 
Participation equation Dependent variable: 1 if a respondent reported expected devaluation, 0 otherwise 
Education 0.735*** (0.052) 
0.734*** 
(0.053) 
Age -0.002 (0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Female -0.171*** (0.050) 
-0.174*** 
(0.052) 
Constant -1.018*** (0.090) 
1.016*** 
(0.090) 
λ  -1.774 (1.181) 
0.549 
(1.176) 
Wald chi2(9) 
Number of observation 
83.35 
                  4820 
106.22 
                   4820 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent level.  
A significant value for λ=ρσ, where σ is the estimated standard error of the residuals of the probit equation 
and ρ is the estimated correlation of the residuals from the participation and the regression equations, 
indicates evidence of self-selection bias.  
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Table 1 
Knowledge about the operations of the Bulgarian currency board. 
National surveys, Bulgaria, 2000 - 2004. 
Summary statistics. 
 
Statement 1 
(monetary discretion) 
Statement 2 
(government debt) 
Statement 3 
(forex reserves)  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Strongly 
agree 38.5 35.7 38.4 36.6 26.7 20.6 19.9 - 16.8 17.6 19.3 21.2 - 16.2 16.8 
Agree 18.2 19.0 13.3 13.0 9.9 13.5 16.5 - 13.9 10.1 17.2 24.3 - 13.3 9.9 
Disagree  8.8 6.5 8.1 3.2 4.1 10.5 8.1 - 5.2 5.5 12.2 6.4 - 3.8 4.9 
Strongly 
disagree 4.8 4.9 1.9 4.0 3.9 4.6 5.7 - 6.8 1.7 7.2 5.1 - 6.1 2.7 
I don’t 
know 29.7 33.9 38.3 43.2 55.4 50.8 49.8 - 57.3 65.1 43.9 43.0 - 60.6 65.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: The numbers of the table are percent of the total by type of response. 
Statement 1: Under the currency board, the authorities cannot issue currency at their discretion. 
Statement 2: Under the currency board, the government cannot borrow funds from the central bank. 
Statement 3: Under the currency board, the leva (domestic money) in circulation have full coverage by the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. 
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Table 2 
What is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse in the next 6 months, 
12 months, or 5 years with a sharp devaluation of the local currency?  
National surveys, Bulgaria, 2000 - 2004. 
Percent of respondents by type of response. 
 
 
6 months horizon 12 months horizon 5 years horizon 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Very big 12.3 5.5 4.6 3.5 3.9 12.4 4.7 6.7 3.8 3.8 13.3 7.4 9.9 8.9 12.7 
Big 19.0 9.7 10.9 9.3 7.9 24.0 14.4 11.9 12.9 11.0 25.7 22.3 16.3 18.9 12.5 
Small  29.7 28.3 28.5 31.1 28.1 28.7 31.6 29.9 31.5 25.1 30.4 29.3 27.6 25.7 23.3 
Very small 13.5 23.2 14.2 17.1 14.0 15.2 24.6 15.5 17.0 19.2 12.0 20.4 11.6 13.9 12.9 
None 20.6 30.7 26.7 26.6 34.7 15.3 21.7 20.5 21.8 29.5 12.9 16.8 17.7 18.2 26.3 
I don’t 
know 4.8  2.6 15.1 12.4 11.4 4.5 3.0 15.5 13.0 11.4 5.7 3.8 16.9 14.4 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 3 
Expectations of devaluation for the more and less informed respondents.  
National surveys, Bulgaria, 2000 - 2004. 
 
What is the likelihood of devaluation in the next:  
6 months 1 year 5 years  
Un-
informed Informed 
Un-
informed Informed 
Un-
informed Informed 
Big or very big  17.65 20.09 20.73 25.03* 27.97 36.36* 
Small or very 
small  48.70 50.99 50.56 53.72* 43.23 48.08* 
Zero 33.65 28.93* 28.71 21.25* 28.80 15.56* 
Notes: Informed are the survey respondents who agree or strongly agree with at least one of the statements 
on currency board operations.  
* indicates that the difference between the answers of informed and uninformed respondents is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
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Table 4 
Perceived risk of devaluation. Ordered probit model. 
National surveys, Bulgaria, 2000 - 2004. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Expected Devaluation ranges from 1 
(high probability of devaluation) to 5 (zero probability of 
devaluation) 
 6 months  forecast horizon 
1 year  
forecast horizon 
5 years  
forecast horizon 
Informed -0.077** (0.035) 
-0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.284*** 
(0.035) 
Education 0.016 (0.040) 
-0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.074* 
(0.040) 
Age  0.002* (0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Female -0.015 (0.032) 
-0.016 
(0.032) 
0.030 
(0.032) 
Voting for UDF 0.091* (0.050) 
0.124** 
(0.049) 
0.170*** 
(0.050) 
Dummy for 2001 survey 0.462*** (0.048) 
0.433*** 
(0.048) 
0.289*** 
(0.048) 
Dummy for 2002 survey 0.379*** (0.053) 
0.341*** 
(0.053) 
0.204*** 
(0.053) 
Dummy for 2003 survey 0.416*** (0.051) 
0.423*** 
(0.050) 
0.229*** 
(0.050) 
Dummy for 2004 survey 0.547*** (0.051) 
0.596*** 
(0.050) 
0.329*** 
(0.050) 
LR chi2(7) 
Number of observation 
160.61*** 
          4376 
196.74*** 
           4367 
157.99*** 
           4314 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent level.  
 
  
